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ARTICLES
KEEPING FAITH WITH THE VISION:
INTERPRETING A CONSTITUTION FOR THIS AND
FUTURE GENERATIONS
James C. Nelson*
Referring to the words of the United States Constitution, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes observed that "they have called into life a being the devel-
opment of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters."I So, too, with the Montana Constitution. The dele-
gates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention ("Con Con") and, ulti-
mately, Montanans themselves created a living document-"a cohesive set
of fundamental principles, carefully drafted and committed to an abstract
ideal of just government." 2 Our 1972 Constitution was born of a desire-
indeed, a vision-to improve the quality of life, to establish equality of
opportunity, and to secure the blessings of liberty for this and future genera-
tions.3 The principles articulated in it, like those of the federal Constitution,
were "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs."4 Hence, their words must be under-
stood "in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what
was said thirty-eight years ago." 5 And for the most part, this set of princi-
ples has thrived and endured. It has been tested in and nurtured by Mon-
* Montana Supreme Court Justice. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance and advice from my
legal research assistant, Brent Larson, in writing this article.
1. Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
2. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 383 (Mont. 1999).
3. Mont. Const. preamble; see also Snetsinger v. Mont. U. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 454 (Mont. 2004)
(Nelson, J., specially concurring) (discussing the delegates' intention that art. II, § 34 be used as a
source of innovative judicial activity in the field of civil liberties).
4. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).
5. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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tana's courts over the last four decades. The vision is alive. It must be
passed from this to future generations.
When asked to do a paper on constitutional interpretation and the im-
portance of the courts, I immediately faced the dilemma of what to say, in a
few pages, on a topic about which books are written. 6 I elected the simplest
approach 7-that is, to offer my personal perspectives on the topic. 8
With that in mind, I believe it is only fair to say, at the outset, that I
have two biases in writing this article. First, I am, unabashedly, a champion
of Montana's 1972 Constitution. 9 And second, a point which follows from
the first, I do not want to see the Constitution upended. Yet, I fear we may
be on the brink of doing just that because Montanans (who will vote this
year on whether to hold another constitutional convention) do not, generally
speaking, understand the Constitution's vision, its guarantees, and the
unique civil rights they now enjoy under it.
The framers of the 1972 Constitution recognized that "legitimate gov-
emment is founded on the will of the people" and that Montanans have "the
right . . . to govern themselves."' 0 These fundamental principles of popular
sovereignty and self-government were incorporated into the Constitution as
the first two sections of the Declaration of Rights." Article II, § 1 states
that "All political power is vested in and derived from the people[,]" and
"All government of right originates with the people, is founded upon their
will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole." 1 2 Article 11,
§ 2, in turn, recognizes that the people "have the exclusive right of gov-
erning themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state" and "may
alter or abolish the constitution and form of government whenever they
6. See e.g. Goodwin Liu, Pamela S. Karlan, & Christopher H. Schroeder, Keeping Faith with the
Constitution (Am. Const. Socy. for L. and Policy 2009); It is a Constitution We are Expounding: Col-
lected Writings on Interpreting Our Founding Document (Am. Const. Socy. for L. and Policy 2009);
Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions (Oxford U. Press 2009).
7. The principle of Occam's razor seemed appropriate: When a multitude of approaches are avail-
able, the simplest explanation or strategy tends to be the best one. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 803 (10th ed. 1997).
8. I do not purport to speak for any past or present member of the Montana Supreme Court. This
article has not been vetted with any past or present member of the Montana Supreme Court. Indeed, I
expect that there are-as there should be-conflicting and differing views on the matters discussed
herein. Moreover, my views are offered with my great respect for my colleagues-with whom I usu-
ally, but not always, agree.
9. Unless otherwise indicated, references in this article to "Constitution," "Article," and "Section"
are to Montana's 1972 Constitution and its constituent parts.
10. Mont. Const. Cony. Transcr., Vol. II, 626 (1972) (available at http://courts.mt.gov/content/li-
brary/mt consconvention/vol2.pdf) [hereinafter Constitutional Convention Transcript Vol. Il].
11. Montana's Declaration of Rights is set out in art. I, §§ 1-35.
12. Id. at art. II, § 1.
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deem it necessary."' 3 It is not surprising, therefore, that the framers also
included a provision (Article XIV, § 3) calling for periodic review of the
Constitution. 14 As explained during the Con Con debate, this provision
gives the people "a chance to continually, in sort of a generation after gen-
eration, take a hard, questioning and political look at their Constitution-
see if there is need for a convention."' 5  It is thus "a further guarantee that
the people will retain a firm hold on the power of constituting govern-
ment."16 Not only that, periodic review is also intended to get the people
involved in, and make them knowledgeable of, their Constitution. As ex-
plained by Delegate Gene Harbaugh:
I think that one of the things that fosters [voter apathy] is taking a constitution
and putting it on the shelf for 90 years. Very few people in the state, I be-
lieve, today are aware of what the present Constitution says, and I think that
this method of bringing the Constitution before the people will insure that this
will not happen again. And I think we want the people of our state to know
what's in the Constitution; otherwise, there's not much point in having a con-
stitution.17
These points are well-taken. I have always maintained that our Consti-
tution is the peoples' document. It is, in my view, the most progressive,
people-friendly, and pro-civil-rights organic document of any state constitu-
tion. Notably, as professors Elison and Snyder have pointed out, seventeen
provisions of the Declaration of Rights have no parallel in the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution.'8 In this spirit, therefore, it is entirely
fitting that our Constitution should be subject to reexamination by the peo-
ple from time to time.
Of course, the framers contemplated that this reexamination would
promote public familiarity with the Constitution and result in an informed
13. Id. at art. II, § 2.
14. Id. at art. XIV, § 3 ("If the question of holding a convention is not otherwise submitted during
any period of 20 years, it shall be submitted as provided by law at the general election in the twentieth
year following the last submission.").
15. Mont. Const. Cony. Transcr., Vol. 1, 462 (1972) (Delegate Harold Arbanas) (available at http://
courts.mt.gov/content/ibrary/mtcons convention/vol l.pdf) [hereinafter Constitutional Convention
Transcript Vol. 1].
16. Id. (Delegate Mark Etchart).
17. Id. (Delegate Harbaugh).
18. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 20
(Greenwood Press 2001) (citing Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana
Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1095, 1122 (1985)). Collins lists the following Article H sections not con-
tained in the Bill of Rights: § 4 (dignity, equality, and nondiscrimination), § 8 (right to participate), § 9
(right to know), § 10 (right of privacy), § 14 (adult rights), § 15 (rights of non-adults), § 16 (administra-
tion of justice), § 18 (state subject to suit), § 20 (initiation of criminal proceedings), § 23 (detention),
§ 27 (imprisonment for debt), § 28 (rights of the convicted), § 29 (award of litigation expenses in emi-
nent domain proceedings), § 30 (treason and descent of estates), § 32 (civilian control of the military),
§ 33 (importation of armed persons), and § 35 (special considerations for servicepersons and veterans).
Id. at 1122 n. 184.
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determination of whether it needs revision. Indeed, the momentous deci-
sion of whether to hold another constitutional convention must proceed
from a true understanding of what the present Constitution says, what it
protects, and the unique vision it brings to governance. As noted, our Con-
stitution is a cohesive set of principles, carefully drafted and committed to
an abstract ideal of just government, born of a vision to improve the quality
of life, to establish equality of opportunity, and to secure the blessings of
liberty for this and future generations. 19 But it is not merely a cookbook of
heady aspirations. Rather, it is a compact of overlapping and interrelated
rights and guarantees 20-Such as the rights of popular sovereignty, self-
government, and suffrage;21 the rights to examine documents and observe
the deliberations of all public agencies and to participate in the operation of
those agencies; 22 the rights to assemble peaceably, to protest governmental
action, and to speak freely; 2 3 the rights to a quality educational system and
to equality of educational opportunity; 24 the rights to dignity, privacy, and
expression;25 the rights to acquire, possess, and protect property and to ob-
tain just compensation when property is taken or damaged for public use; 2 6
the right to obtain full legal redress in a court of justice for every injury to
person, property, or character, including injuries perpetrated by the govern-
ment;27 the rights to equal protection of the laws, due process of law, and
trial by jury; 28 the rights in criminal cases to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to receive a speedy
public trial, and to be free from self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and
cruel and unusual punishment; 29 the guarantee that the Legislature shall not
pass a special act, an ex post facto law, a law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or a law making an irrevocable grant of special privileges;3 0 and
the rights to a clean and healthful environment, to pursue life's basic neces-
sities, and to seek safety, health, and happiness in all lawful ways.31 These
are not simply ambitions to strive for when convenient. They are com-
mands. They are not only mandatory, but prohibitory as well. They limit
the power of the government and secure to the people those protections that
19. See Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383; Mont. Const. preamble.
20. See id.
21. Mont. Const. art. H, §§ 1, 2, 13.
22. Id. at art. II, §§ 8, 9.
23. Id. at art. II, §§ 6, 7.
24. Id. at art. X, § 1(1), (3).
25. Id. at art. II, §§ 4, 7, 10.
26. Id. at art. II, §§ 3, 29.
27. Mont. Const. art. H, §§ 16, 18; but see Mont. Code. Ann. §§ 2-9-101 to 114 (2009).
28. Id. at art. II, §§ 4, 17, 26.
29. Id. at art. II, §§ 22, 24, 25.
30. Id. at art. II, § 31; Mont. Const. art. V, § 12.
31. Id. at art. H, § 3; Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1.
Vol. 71302
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are fundamental to the exercise of liberty in a free society. As recognized
by the Bill of Rights Committee, these protections "come not from govern-
ment but from the people who create that government." 32 At its core, our
1972 Constitution is a document dedicated to "a more responsible govern-
ment that is Constitutionally commanded never to forget that government is
created solely for the welfare of the people so that the people can more fully
enjoy the heritage of American liberty within the structure of that govern-
ment." 33 This coming 20-year reexamination of our Constitution must not
proceed in ignorance of how important that Constitution is and its unique
balance of interrelated rights and responsibilities within its provisions.34
In this respect, it bears noting that the Constitution was approved by a
margin of only 2,532 votes.35 And it is obvious to even a casual observer
that the political climate in Montana-along with that of the rest of the
country and the world-has changed since 1972. Montana is a less pro-
gressive, more conservative state.
Yet, the present generation faces challenges that are no less significant
than those faced by the Con Con delegates in 1972. Indeed, many of those
challenges are even more exigent and far-reaching: climate change, terror-
ism, economic globalization, worldwide recession, natural disasters,
corporatization, runaway technology, and government hell-bent on main-
taining its own secrecy while routinely invading the personal lives and af-
fairs of the governed, 36 to name but a few.
Roe v. Wade37 (decided the year after our 1972 Constitution was
adopted) set off the most polarizing and divisive debate in society and in
national and state politics since slavery. Like the cosmic microwave radia-
tion left over from the Big Bang,38 the issue of choice hisses in the back-
ground of political decisions, legislation, judicial appointments, and relig-
ious agendas. Hardly a legislative session goes by without a bill or an initi-
ative to limit or interfere with a woman's right to control her own
reproductive decisions. When it comes to this issue, the principle of separa-
tion of church and state has virtually collapsed at both the national and the
state level.39
32. Constitutional Convention Transcript Vol. II, supra n. 10, at 619.
33. Id. at 619.
34. See supra nn. 21-31.
35. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 18, at xv.
36. See State v. A Blue in Color, 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 116 P.3d 800, 806-807 (Mont. 2005)
(Nelson, J., concurring).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration, WMAP Big Bang CMB Test, http://
map.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/bb tests cmb.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2010).
39. See e.g. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 563-572 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (analyzing a Missouri statute that endorsed a particular theological
position on when life begins, and noting that "the intensely divisive character of much of the national
3032010
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There is, also, a pervasive and virulent anti-gay and lesbian sentiment
in most of the country, including Montana. Reflective of this, Montanans in
2004 considered the issue of same-sex marriage-which some have said is
"the last major civil-rights milestone yet to be surpassed in our two-century
struggle to attain the goals we set for this nation at its formation." 40 Re-
jecting the founding principle that all persons are created equal, 4 1 a full
two-thirds (67%) of Montana voters42 chose to amend our Constitution to
deny gay and lesbian couples the right to marry. 4 3 Article XIII, § 7 is the
only provision in Montana's Constitution that affirmatively strips an entire
class of citizens of an elemental civil right accorded, presumptively and
without thought or hesitation, to all other Montanans.44 It is a disgraceful
stain on an otherwise venerable document dedicated to equality and the
advancement of civil rights. Article XIII, § 7 was "born of animosity to-
ward the class of persons affected" 45 and a desire to exclude a politically
unpopular group from mainstream society. It is the first time in Montana's
history that invidious discrimination has been constitutionalized-and in
apparent contradiction to the promises of equality4 6 and the inalienable
right to the pursuit of happiness 47 set out in Montana's Declaration of
Rights.
Similarly, extractive industries, business entities, and the Legislature
continue to chafe against Montanans' inalienable right to a clean and
healthful environment. 48 Indeed, despite the constitutional mandate that it
debate over the abortion issue reflects the deeply held religious convictions of many participants in the
debate").
40. Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage is an
American Value, Newsweek 48 (Jan. 18, 2010) (available at http://www.newsweek.comlid/229957). Ol-
son, known as "one of the more prominent Republicans in Washington, and among the most formidable
conservative lawyers in the country," served as head of the Office of Legal Counsel under Ronald
Reagan and as solicitor general under George W. Bush. Eve Conant, The Conscience of a Conservative,
Newsweek 47 (Jan. 18, 2010) (available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/229956).
41. See Declaration of Independence ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal . . .").
42. Montana Secretary of State, 2004 Statewide General Election Results 4, http://sos.mt.gov/elec-
tions/archives/2000s/2004/2004-GenState.pdf (Nov. 2, 2004) (reflecting 295,070 votes in favor, and
148,263 votes against, Constitutional Initiative 96).
43. Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7 ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid
or recognized as a marriage in this state.").
44. See Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 454-466 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., specially concurring); Kulstad
v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 610-611 (Mont. 2009) (Nelson, J., concurring).
45. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
46. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
47. Id. at art. HI, § 3.
48. Id. at art. II, § 3; see e.g. MEIC v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality., 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999) (con-
cerning the discharge of groundwater containing high levels of arsenic and zinc); Cape-France Enters.
v. Est. of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001) (concerning the drilling of a well, which could cause signifi-
cant degradation of uncontaminated aquifers); Seven Up Pete Venture v. State, 114 P.3d 1009 (Mont.
2005) (concerning cyanide leaching for mining purposes).
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provide for the maintenance and improvement of a clean and healthful envi-
ronment,49 the Legislature has instead effectively abdicated this duty in
favor of the federal government's minimal standards 50-none of which pur-
port to implement Montana's constitutional requirement of a clean and
healthful environment.
In this new century, Montanans, along with other Americans, seem all
too eager to accept greater interference by the government in their private
lives and affairs. They willingly trade individual privacy for illusory secur-
ity, personal autonomy for legislated morality, transparency in government
for secrecy, and whiz-bang technology for almost any price. In these times
of economic recession, war, terrorist paranoia, and religious zealotry, my
fear is that a new constitutional convention may well produce a document
that is less grounded in respect for the fundamental human rights and liber-
ties Montanans now enjoy-and, unfortunately, largely take for granted-
and more influenced by partisan and sectarian ideology, corporate self-ag-
grandizement, and the agendas of special interests. Giving up constitutional
protections and guarantees for a feel-good sense of security, for economic
gain, or for partisan or religious ideology is not unlike buying into a Ponzi
scheme51 : It is a swindle where the short term "gains" ultimately lead to the
collapse of the subterfuge and the loss of an irreplaceable investment. In-
deed, I believe that Montanans have much to lose by compromising their
present Constitution and little, or nothing, to gain by it. And I doubt that
most people appreciate this fact; at least, they will not appreciate it until it is
too late to undo the damage. I do not want to see the 2010 vote on whether
to call a new constitutional convention hijacked by those who want to
change the Constitution for their own narrow and self-serving purposes.
Accordingly, and without apology, I am an ardent advocate for Mon-
tana's 1972 Constitution. I do not want to see it undone. The document is
visionary. It has always been ahead of its time in the protection of liberty,
and our Court has repeatedly recognized that Montana's Constitution af-
fords greater rights and heightened protections than does its federal counter-
49. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1.
50. See 1995 Mont. Laws ch. 471 (providing, as a general rule, that state air quality, water quality,
and waste control regulations shall be no more stringent than federal regulations or guidelines); see also
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 75-2-207, 75-5-203, 75-6-116, 75-10-107 (2009).
51. A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment arrangement in which returns are paid not from any
underlying business venture, but from monies obtained from later investors. The fraud consists of fun-
neling proceeds received from new investors to previous investors in the guise of profits from the al-
leged business venture, thereby cultivating an illusion that a legitimate profit-making business opportu-
nity exists and inducing further investment. As a result of the absence of sufficient (or any) assets able
to generate funds necessary to pay the promised returns, the success of such a scheme guarantees its
demise because the operator must attract more and more funds, which thereby creates a greater need for
funds to pay previous investors, all of which ultimately causes the scheme to collapse. Mosley v. Am.
Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2010 MT 78, 3 n. 1, _ P.3d _ (Mont. 2010).
2010 305
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part. 52 If a fully informed citizenry determines to alter or abolish it, know-
ing what guarantees, rights, and protections they will lose or, hopefully,
gain, so be it. The Constitution guarantees that right to the people.5 3 How-
ever, I come to my task in the firm belief that our Constitution's core princi-
ples, values, and structure should not be sacrificed on the altars of politics,
religion, and greed.
Proceeding, then, with my discussion of constitutional interpretation
and the importance of the courts, it is useful to address the latter point first.
The Framers of the federal Constitution recognized that "The accumulation
of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 5 4  To ensure
against such tyranny, the Framers provided that the federal power would be
dispersed among three distinct branches-the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial-each subject to substantive and procedural limitations.55
The framers of the Montana Constitution divided the power of state govern-
ment in the same manner. 56 This system of separated powers and checks
52. See e.g. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1986) (art. H, § 4 vis-A-vis the
Fourteenth Amendment), superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Zempel v. Uninsured
Employers' Fund, 938 P.2d 658, 661-662 (Mont. 1997); Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 883 (Mont. 2003)
(art. II, §§ 4 and 22 vis-A-vis the Eighth Amendment); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121-122 (Mont.
1997) (art. II, § 10 vis-A-vis the Fourteenth Amendment and the penumbral rights of privacy and repose
contained in the Bill of Rights); Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364, 372-374 (Mont. 1999) (art. II, § 10 vis-A-vis
the Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Mont. 1977) (art. H, §§ 10 and 11
vis-A-vis the Fourth Amendment), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 155,
157 (Mont. 1985); State v. Sierra, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Mont. 1985) (same), overruled in part on other
grounds, State v. Pastos, 887 P.2d 199 (Mont. 1994); State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75-76 (Mont. 1995)
(same); State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 183-184 (Mont. 1997) (same), overruled in part on other
grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556, 559 (Mont. 1998); Deserly v. Dept. of Corrects., 995 P.2d 972,
977 (same); State v. Martinez, 67 P.3d 207, 220 (Mont. 2003) (same); Vernon Kills On Top v. State, 928
P.2d 182, 204 (Mont. 1996) (art. H, § 22 vis-A-vis the Eighth Amendment); Ranta v. State, 958 P.2d
670, 673-677 (Mont. 1998) (art. H, § 24 vis-A-vis the Sixth Amendment); Woirhaye v. Dist. Ct., 972
P.2d 800, 801-804 (Mont. 1998) (art. II, §§ 24 and 26 vis-A-vis the Sixth Amendment); State v. John-
son, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-1255 (Mont. 1986), as clarified by State v. Buck, 134 P.3d 53, 65-66 (Mont.
2006) (art. II, § 25 vis-A-vis the Fifth Amendment); State v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312, 316 (Mont. 1999)
(same); cf State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 829-830 (Mont. 2007); State v. West, 194 P.3d 683, 690-691
(Mont. 2008).
53. Mont. Const. art. II, § 2.
54. James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, in The Federalist, 324 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan
U. Press 1961).
55. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizensfor Abatement ofAircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,
272 (1991); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion).
56. Mont. Const. art. 11, § I ("The power of the government of this state is divided into three
distinct branches-legislative, executive, and judicial.").
306 Vol. 71
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and balances is "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or ag-
grandizement of one branch at the expense of the other"57 and, as such, is
"a vital check against tyranny."58
Among the three coequal branches of government, "It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 5 9
At the core of this power is the judiciary's "independent responsibility" 60 -
its "ultimate and supreme function" 6 1-to interpret the Constitution and en-
sure that legislative and executive acts are consistent with it, a determina-
tion that is "the very essence of judicial duty." 62 This principle-that the
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution-has
long been respected as "a permanent and indispensable feature of our con-
stitutional system." 63 The judiciary's power to enforce the Constitution and
award appropriate relief provides an important safeguard against abuses of
legislative and executive power and ensures an independent judiciary.6 In
this respect, the judiciary serves as guardian of the people's constitutional
liberties. 65
For these reasons, the notions that the legislature has "plenary
power" 66 and that the judiciary should not "second-guess" acts of the legis-
lative branch67 are false. In this connection, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclu-
sive upon the other departments, it may be answered that this cannot be the
natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provi-
sions in the constitution.68
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 121.
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), accord, Mont. Petroleum Tank Release Compen.
Bd. v. Crumleys, Inc., 174 P.3d 948 (Mont. 2008).
60. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-379 (2000) (plurality opinion).
61. Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
62. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
63. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
64. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Co. Pub. Schs, 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992). Of course, this power must be
exercised within the context of a concrete dispute. See Greater Missoula Area Fedn. of Early Childhood
Educators v. Child Start, Inc., 219 P.3d 881, 889 (Mont. 2009); Hardy v. Krutzfeldt, 672 P.2d 274, 276
(Mont. 1983); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971).
65. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, supra n. 54, at 524 (The courts have the duty
"to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reserva-
tions of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103
(1958) ('The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual
rights."); State v. Finley, 915 P.2d 208, 213 (Mont. 1996) ("Appellate courts have the inherent duty to
interpret the constitution and to protect individual rights set forth in the constitution . . . ."), overruled in
part on other grounds, State v. Gallagher, 19 P.3d 817, 822 (Mont. 2001).
66. Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 500 (Mont. 1989).
67. Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 227 P.3d 42, 47 (Mont. 2009).
68. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, supra n. 54, at 524-525 (italics omitted).
2010 307
9
Nelson: Interpreting a Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2010
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Noting that the will of the people declared in the Constitution is superior to
the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, Hamilton stated:
It is not otherwise to be supposed that the constitution could intend to enable
the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constit-
uents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. 69
In fact, the Framers expressed particular concern about "the dangerous
concentration of governmental powers into the hands of the legislature." 70
James Madison, for example, recognized that the representatives of the ma-
jority in a democratic society, if unconstrained, may pose a threat to liberty
similar to that posed by a too powerful executive. 7t "[L]egislative usurpa-
tions," he wrote, "which by assembling all power in the same hands, must
lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations." 7 2 He
further explained:
[I]n a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully lim-
ited both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative
power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence
over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is suffi-
ciently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so
numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means
which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this depart-
ment, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions.
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from
other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive
and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater facility, mask
under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes
on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real-ni-
cety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure, will,
or will not extend beyond the legislative sphere. 73
Madison decried the potential for a tyranny of the majority, pointing
out that it is as important to guard the minority in our society against injus-
tice by the majority as it is to guard society itself against the oppression of
its rulers. 74 Hamilton similarly expressed concern about "serious oppres-
sions of the minor party in the community" and intrusions by the majority
69. Id. at 525.
70. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995).
71. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 273.
72. James Madison, The Federalist No. 48, supra n. 54, at 333.
73. Id. at 333-334.
74. See James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, supra n. 54, at 351. In Gryczan, the Court noted
that "[ojf all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppres-
sive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber
baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment
us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own con-
Vol. 71308
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on the rights of individuals.75 He thought that an independent judiciary was
"peculiarly essential" to the protection of those rights. 76 Indeed, it is now
settled that the courts play a "special role in safeguarding the interests of
those groups that are relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess."77 Such protection is guaranteed as a matter of constitutional law by
Montana's Declaration of Rights, which declares at the outset that govern-
ment "is instituted solely for the good of the whole" 78-not just the major-
ity.
Accordingly, the importance of the courts and an independent judici-
ary cannot be overemphasized. It is not sufficient to acknowledge merely
that the judiciary is one of three coequal and independent branches of gov-
ernment. It must further be recognized that on the shoulders of the court
system rests the responsibility and obligation to resolve disputes, to inter-
pret and apply statutes, and to establish precedent. Those who maintain that
judges do not make law and policy are mistaken. Every published decision
of a court of record makes law-precedent-and those judicial decisions
together comprise what we know as the "common law."7 9 Each decision is
binding on the litigants in the given case and, as well, on future litigants in
other cases and on the other branches of government, unless the decision is
statutorily or judicially overruled. And when it comes to the Constitution,
the judiciary bears an even weightier responsibility and obligation. The
courts must interpret and say what the law is under that seminal document.
They must articulate what the Constitution means within the context of its
language, its spirit, and the question at issue. They must uphold laws that
are in accord with it and strike down laws that are not. They must protect
the processes of constitutional government and the rights of the governed.
Of course, "courts" in the abstract do not make these decisions.
Rather, judges-especially, appellate judges-do. In this regard, the inter-
pretive authority of the Montana Supreme Court vis-A-vis the Montana
science." 942 P.2d at 125 (Mont. 1997) (quoting C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment,
in God in the Dock 287, 292 (Eerdmans 1970)).
75. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, supra n. 54, at 527.
76. See id. at 524, 527.
77. Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted);
cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (noting "one aspect of the judiciary's
role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect 'discrete and insular minorities' from majoritarian
prejudice or indifference" (quoting U. S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938))).
78. Mont. Const. art. II, § I (emphasis added).
79. Black's Law Dictionary 270 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999) (defining "common
law" as "The body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions");
see also Mont. Code Ann. Tit 1, Ch. 1, Pt 1.
3092010
11
Nelson: Interpreting a Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2010
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Constitution is grounded in the ideal that our State's nonpartisan,80 no-term-
limits8' judiciary is insulated from the pressures of party politics. Mon-
tana's judges and justices, thus, bear the responsibility of exercising their
power of judicial review so as to decide cases and constitutional questions
without regard to partisan ideology.
Unlike federal judges and justices, however, Montana's judiciary is
elected. While various members of the federal bench have leveled criticism
at state systems that elect judges rather than appoint them,82 such criticism
is, in my experience, quite misplaced. From observing the process of filling
federal judicial vacancies-vacancies on the United States Supreme Court
especially-it is apparent that the appointment-and-confirmation process is
itself dominated by partisanship and payback and takes place in hearings
that provide little more than posturing and political theater-where the de-
fining (albeit never-mentioned) issue is whether the nominee is pro-life or
pro-choice.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that elected judges' impartiality
and votes on high-profile cases may be affected by having to run for reelec-
tion or retention; in other words, a judge's decision-making may be skewed
by conscious or unconscious concern over how her decision or vote will
play in the press, with the public, or with a political party, lobby, or special-
interest group.83 I do not share this view. To say that such thoughts do not
occasionally cross one's mind would be disingenuous. However, the impli-
cation that such fears ultimately drive the judge's decision-making is
(again, in my experience) overstated. The elected judges and justices with
whom I am familiar make decisions based on the facts and the law as they
see it, regardless of whose ox is gored in the process. While a judge may
not be reelected because of his voting record generally, or because of some
other problem in his professional or personal life, a judicial election decided
on the basis of one unpopular decision is relatively rare.
In any event, based on three statewide campaigns, it has been my ex-
perience that Montanans want nonpartisan judges and will not elect candi-
dates who fail that threshold test. Moreover, Montana, with its severe cam-
paign-contribution restrictions, 84 has not faced the sort of buy-a-judge
problems that have poisoned elections in states where there are sky-is-the-
limit individual and corporate contributions.85 Also, in December 2008, our
80. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13-14-111, 13-35-23; 2008 Mont. Code of Jud. Conduct, Rule 4.1,
at 36.
81. See Mont. Const. art. IV, § 8.
82. See e.g. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-792 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
83. See id. at 788-789.
84. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13-35-227, 13-37-216.
85. See e.g. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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Court adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct, which should further ame-
liorate any nagging concerns about partisan partiality and campaign fun-
draising.8 6
That said, however, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission87 may change the entire
landscape of judicial elections in Montana and elsewhere. This decision
held that provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which
prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to
make "electioneering communications," violate the right to free speech
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 8 While the
Court's decision nominally involves candidates for federal office, Justice
Stevens aptly points out that:
[T]he consequences of today's holding will not be limited to the legislative or
executive context. The majority of the States select their judges through pop-
ular elections. At a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elec-
tions have reached a fever pitch, see, e.g., O'Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St.
Journal, Nov. 15, 2007, p. A25; Brief for Justice at Stake et al. as Amici
Curiae 2, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union
general treasury spending in these races. Perhaps "Caperton motions" will
catch some of the worst abuses. This will be small comfort to those States
that, after today, may no longer have the ability to place modest limits on
corporate electioneering even if they believe such limits to be critical to main-
taining the integrity of their judicial systems.89
I wholeheartedly agree with Justice Stevens's observations. Indeed, if
Montana's judicial races ultimately become little more than exercises in
pandering to special interests and corporations and are decided on slick ads
and sound bites, then the people of this state should seriously consider
amending the Constitution to provide for judicial appointments based on
merit. The judiciary must not become prostitutes for big business and spe-
cial interests-Citizens United notwithstanding.
For the time being, however, having now served, since my appoint-
ment in May 1993, with three different Chief Justices90 and ten different
compositions of Montana Supreme Court justices, I can say confidently that
Montana has enjoyed a consistently hardworking, fair, impartial, and well-
managed Supreme Court. To be sure, there have been-and there no doubt
will continue to be-serious disagreements from time to time over issues,
86. See 2008 Mont. Code of Jud. Conduct, Application I.(A) at 6, Canon 4 at 36, Rules 4.1 to 4.4 at
36-42.
87. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
88. See id. at 913.
89. See id. at 968 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
90. Jean A. Turnage, Karla M. Gray, and Mike McGrath.
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particularly constitutional ones.91 Yet, while interpretative philosophies
vary from justice to justice, members of the Court have approached each
case open-minded and willing to listen to arguments and counterarguments
of counsel and the discussion of colleagues during conference. Each case is
fully vetted before votes are cast and final opinions are signed. Deciding
cases is a process-and an interesting and challenging one at that. But each
member of the Court with whom I have served has taken his or her power
of judicial review seriously-especially when it comes to interpreting Mon-
tana's Constitution. I believe that each justice on Montana's Supreme
Court appreciates and values the special grandness and vision of our Consti-
tution-regardless of how any given case might be decided.
As a final observation, before delving into my approach to constitu-
tional interpretation, I note that every change of membership on the Court
has lent a different dynamic to the Court's deliberations and decisions.
Elison and Snyder give a snapshot of how the Courts of the 1970s, '80s,
and '90s differed,92 and I will leave it to those who study and characterize
the various makeups of the Court and its decisions in a global fashion to
judge and grade the Courts since. But as a general proposition, I do not
think that members of the public fully recognize and appreciate just how
important judicial appointments and elections are-especially those for the
Supreme Court. Relative to elections for governor and legislative seats,
judicial elections in general are not high-profile and do not draw significant
public attention. Indeed, they often are "under the radar." And yet, one
member of the Court casting one vote can, and often does, change the out-
come of a case and the course of constitutional law for generations. Indeed,
where constitutional issues and fundamental rights are at stake, the outcome
of a particular case will affect not only the litigants in that case, but also
litigants in future cases for years to come. In matters of constitutional inter-
pretation, the courts are, thus, critical.
That said, if a new constitutional convention is called, I urge the dele-
gates not to "fix" the judiciary. Aside from always being short of judges,
staff, and money and eventually needing an intermediate appellate court,
the judicial branch and the judiciary are not broken. They work just fine.
91. Indeed, I have disagreed strenuously with the Court on a number of occasions. See e.g. Guil-
laume, 975 P.2d at 320-321 (Nelson, J., Turnage, C.J., & Gray, J., dissenting); State v. Mizenko, 127
P.3d 458, 471-571 (Mont. 2006) (Nelson & Cotter, JJ., dissenting); State v. Barnaby, 142 P.3d 809,
823-851 (Mont. 2006) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 158
P.3d 377, 389-418 (Mont. 2007) (Nelson & Cotter, JJ., dissenting); Jones v. Mont. U. Sys, 155 P.3d
1247, 1258-1278 (Mont. 2007) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Prosser v. Kennedy Enters., 179 P.3d 1178,
1190-1200 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Kajka v. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 201 P.3d 8,
33-70 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson, Rice, & Swandal, JJ., dissenting); Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 95-113
(Mont. 2008) (Nelson & Swandal, JJ., dissenting); Gonzales v. City of Bozeman, 217 P.3d 487, 496-508
(Mont. 2009) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 52-72 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
92. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 18, at xvii-xviii.
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Montana's judges and justices are, for the most part, doing a good job in
keeping the vision of the Constitution alive.
Turning now to constitutional interpretation, I first note two caveats on
the ensuing discussion.
First, while courts follow a variety of rules in conducting constitutional
analysis, I do not attempt to cover this particular aspect of my topic in any
great detail, as doing so would take me far beyond the scope of this article.
It suffices here to note a number of the rules9 3 and the fact that a few of us
believe some of the rules should be changed.94
Second, I have no intent to pontificate on how justices should or
should not decide cases in general, or constitutional issues in particular.
Each justice has his or her own approach and philosophy, and one is proba-
bly no better or worse than another. The beauty of the Supreme Court and
its decision-making process is that the members of the Court bring seven
individual interpretational approaches and philosophies to the table. The
result is that the whole-i.e., the Court's decision-is usually greater than
the sum of its parts-i.e., the interpretational approaches and philosophies
of the individual justices.
I must stress here that the Court's opinion 95 in a given case represents
the thoughts, input, criticism, and agreement of each member of the Court
who signs on to it. Opinion writing is a collaborative enterprise. While the
93. For example, the constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed. We at-
tempt to construe a statute in a manner that avoids unconstitutional interpretation. The question of
constitutionality is not whether it is possible to condemn, but whether it is possible to uphold the legisla-
tive action. The party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt; and, if any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the statute. The constitution-
ality of a statute is a question of law, and our review of constitutional questions is plenary. See Powell
v. State Compen. Ins. Fund, 15 P.3d 877, 881 (Mont. 2000); State v. Trull, 136 P.3d 551, 557 (Mont.
2006); State v. Knudson, 174 P.3d 469, 471 (Mont. 2007).
94. See e.g. Oberson v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 171 P.3d 715, 723 (Mont. 2007) (Leaphart, Nelson, &
Cotter, JJ., concurring); Rohlfs, 354 Mont. at 171 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
95. I refer to the opinion joined by at least four members of the Court as the "Court's opinion," as
that is how the decision is correctly denominated. The Court's opinion represents the law of the case
and stands as stare decisis. Where at least four members of the Court agree on a particular disposition
of the case but under differing legal rationales for which there are not four votes, the result is a plurality
opinion plus a concurring opinion, see e.g. State v. Price, 207 P.3d 298 (Mont. 2009), or an opinion
stating the disposition of the case followed by multiple concurring opinions, see e.g. State v. Newman,
127 P.3d 374 (Mont. 2005). Such opinions do not establish precedent on any legal principle for which
there are not four votes. In rare instances, the Court's opinion is not signed by four justices, but instead
consists of a lead opinion and separate concurrences, where the concurring justices join some, but not
all, parts of the lead opinion. See e.g. State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444 (Mont. 2008); Nelson v. State, 195
P.3d 293 (Mont. 2008). Concurring and dissenting opinions are not the opinion of the Court. Finally,
the Court does not function as a committee where there may be a majority report and a minority report.
Although judges (myself included) sometimes refer to the Court's opinion as the "majority opinion,"
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author normally gets the "credit" (or the scorn, as the case may be) for the
opinion in the minds of the press and the public, the Court's opinion is
really that: the collective views of the four (or more) justices who signed it.
Only the concurrences and dissents represent the individual thoughts of the
particular justice (or justices).
Accordingly, what follows are my own personal perspectives on con-
stitutional interpretation. I discuss my interpretational approach and some
of my considerations in deciding constitutional issues, and I offer some ob-
servations about the process itself.9 6
In this regard, I initially am reminded of the oft-told story about three
umpires' responses to the question, "How do you call pitches?" The first
umpire says, "Some are balls and some are strikes, and I call 'em as they
is." The second umpire says, "Some are balls and some are strikes, and I
call 'em as I see 'em." Finally, the third umpire says, "Some are balls and
some are strikes, and they ain't nothin' 'til I call 'em." 9 7 Without trivial-
izing what appellate judges do, I suggest that the resolution of constitutional
questions reflects each of these approaches. In some cases, the answer is
clear. We "call 'em as they is."98 In others, the constitutional question
provokes passionate disagreement due to conflicting perceptions or under-
standings of the issues and the law. In those cases, we "call 'em as we see
'em." 99 And still others involve constitutional principles that, like quantum
particles,100 become known only when identified and articulated by the
Court in the given case. In other words, "they ain't nothin' 'til we call
that is an incorrect reference. It stands more as an editorial characterization by the (usually dissenting)
justice.
96. At this point, I must also acknowledge the indispensible contributions of my clerks-especially
my two permanent clerks, Maria Roberts and Brent Larson-to the opinions I have written. Although I
have had many clerks, I have never had a bad one. Each has contributed his or her special talents,
thoughts, philosophy, perspectives, and hard work to our final product. Similarly, my three judicial
assistants over the years-Doris Shepherd, Sarah Braden, and Lorrie Cole-have provided their talents
for writing and editing and, most importantly, their common sense to my chambers' efforts. Our rule of
thumb is that if it doesn't make sense to the non-lawyers on our team, then it needs to be rewritten.
97. See Hadley Cantril, Perception and Interpersonal Relations, 114 Am. J. Psych. 119, 26 (The
Am. Psych. Assn. Aug. 1957). Notably, this umpire analogy came up during Chief Justice John Rob-
erts' confirmation hearings in 2005. See Tung Yin, Legal Blogs and the Supreme Court Confirmation
Process, II NEXUS 79, 79 (2006).
98. See e.g. Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 975 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1999); Woirhaye, 972 P.2d 800;
Lott v. State, 150 P.3d 337 (Mont. 2006).
99. See e.g. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312; Cape-France Enters., 29 P.3d 1011; Stavenjord v. Mont. St.
Fund, 67 P.3d 229; State v. Mason, 82 P.3d 903 (Mont. 2003); Hofer v. Dept. of Pub. Health and
Human Serys., 124 P.3d 1098 (Mont. 2005); Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458; Oberson, 171 P.3d 715; Sanchez,
177 P.3d 444; State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008); Kafka, 201 P.3d 8; Buhmann, 201 P.3d 70;
Kulstad, 220 P.3d 595; Satterlee v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 222 P.3d 566 (Mont. 2009); Rohlfs, 227
P.3d 42; Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234, 254-269 (Nelson, J., specially concurring), 276-279 (Rice, J.,
dissenting).
100. See Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality 202-208,
540 (Knopf 2004) (discussing the "quantum measurement problem," which is defined as the problem of
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'em."101 But in all of these scenarios, the unique role of appellate judges in
our system is the same: to interpret the Constitution, to determine what it
means, and to say what it says-in a sense, to call the constitutional pitch
one way or the other.
As already noted, I strongly believe in the vision of the Montana Con-
stitution. Therefore, when we are properly presented with a constitutional
question, 102 I start with the premise that the Constitution is a living docu-
ment, whose vitality stems not only from its original vision but also from its
adaptability to changing conditions and evolving norms. This approach, of
course, contrasts with the view of "originalists"-most notably Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas-who believe that a constitution
should be interpreted based exclusively on public understandings of the text
at the time it was ratified.103 However, while the originalist approach may
provide some fodder for debate when it comes to interpreting the federal
Constitution,to0 I believe that it is ill-suited and, indeed, inappropriate when
it comes to interpreting a constitution such as Montana's.
For one thing, Montana's Constitution is not quite 40 years old. It is
written in plain and, for the most part, unambiguous modem language using
words, phrases, and terminology we understand in the same way that the
framers did. It states facts; it makes demands of the government; and it
reserves rights to the governed. For example, "All persons are born free
and have certain inalienable rights," including "the right to a clean and
healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities,
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all
lawful ways."10 5  "The dignity of the human being is inviolable."10 6 "No
explaining how the myriad possibilities encoded in a probability wave give way to a single outcome
when measured).
101. See e.g. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61; Siegal, 934 P.2d 176; Gryczan, 942 P.2d 112; Dorwart v. Cara-
way, 966 P.2d 1121 (Mont. 1998); MEIC, 988 P.2d 1236; Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364; Dorwart v. Cara-
way, 58 P.3d 128; Walker, 68 P.3d 872.
102. See e.g. State v. Makarchuk, 204 P.3d 1213, 1217 (Mont. 2009) (constitutional challenges gen-
erally must be raised and argued first in the district court); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 368 (the challenger
must have standing).
103. See Liu, supra n. 6, at 1. Incidentally, while "originalism" is also referred to sometimes as
"strict constructionism," see id. at 2, I see the latter approach as qualitatively different. In my view,
"strictly construing" constitutional text means interpreting the constitution and articulating its meaning
in accordance with the text's plain and unambiguous language, regardless of how the framers might
have understood that language. This, in fact, is a basic rule of constitutional interpretation. Montanans
for Equal Application of Initiative Laws v. State ex rel. Johnson, 154 P.3d 1202, 1211 (Mont. 2007)
("[Wihere constitutional language is unambiguous and speaks for itself, our obligation is to interpret the
language from the provision alone without resorting to extrinsic methods of interpretation." (citing
Great Falls Trib. Co. v. Great Falls Pub. Sch., 841 P.2d 502, 504 (Mont. 1992))).
104. The differing views expressed in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Ga. v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103 (2006) reflect this debate.
105. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
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person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" or be discriminated
against "in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious
ideas."107 "No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents
or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies . . . ."108
"The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home,
person, and property ... shall not be called in question . . . ."109 "The state
and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environ-
ment in Montana for present and future generations," and "The legislature
shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty."110 "The
legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary
and secondary schools."' While the Montana Supreme Court has, over
time, shaped the meaning of these provisions (and others) by interpreting
them on a case-by-case basis to yield a particular result under a given fac-
tual scenario, we (all Montanans) can still understand the constitutional
words as the framers understood them. We do not have to search for the
meanings of terms, phrases, and concepts written over two centuries ago in
the language of the late 1700s-a time when society, culture, mores, and
technology were dramatically different from those of the present in funda-
mental ways. Thus, even if one adopted an originalist approach to the inter-
pretation of Montana's Constitution, researching public understandings of
the text in 1972 would be more instructive than determinative. 1 12
But this point aside, I believe that the design and purpose of our Con-
stitution actually preclude the use of the originalist approach. To clarify, I
do not suggest that the record of the 1972 Constitutional Convention may
never be consulted. When interpreting constitutional provisions, the Court
often refers to that record,' 13 and I have done so myself in various concur-
106. Id. at art. II, § 4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at art. II, § 9.
109. Id. at art. II, § 12.
110. Id. at art. IX, § 1(1), (2).
111. Mont. Const. art. X, § 1(3).
112. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The study of history for the purpose of
ascertaining the original understanding of constitutional provisions is much like the study of legislative
history for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers who enact statutes. In both situations
the facts uncovered by the study are usually relevant but not necessarily dispositive.").
113. See e.g. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176; Trankel v. Dept. of Mil. Affairs, 938 P.2d 614 (Mont. 1997);
MEIC, 988 P.2d 1236; Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364; State ex rel. Smartt v. Jud. Stands. Commn., 50 P.3d
150 (Mont. 2002); Bryan v. Yellowstone Co. Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 2, 60 P.3d 381 (Mont. 2002);
Kottel v. State, 60 P.3d 403 (Mont. 2002); State v. Mount, 78 P.3d 829 (Mont. 2003); Great Falls Trib.
v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 82 P.3d 876 (Mont. 2003); Wheat v. Brown, 85 P.3d 765 (Mont. 2004); Her-
nandez v. Bd. of Co. Commrs., 189 P.3d 638 (Mont. 2008); Goetz, 191 P.3d 489; State v. Schneider, 197
P.3d 1020 (Mont. 2008).
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rences and dissents.' 14 Rather, I suggest that an approach which requires
the constitutional text to be interpreted based solely on the framers' and the
public's understandings in 1972, and which precludes an interpretation of
the words "in the light of our whole experience" and "what this country [or,
for present purposes, this state] has become,"" 5 is inappropriate. In fact, it
is not at all what the framers intended or hoped to achieve.
Montana's Constitution was written and adopted to be a living docu-
ment-that is, one which adapts to the changing conditions and evolving
norms of our society" 6-not a collection of rules to be rigidly applied
based solely on knowledge, experience, and understandings at the time of
ratification. Indeed, the Preamble states flatly that the people of Montana
ordained and established the Constitution to secure the blessings of liberty
and to improve the quality of life and equality of opportunity "for this and
future generations."'1 7 Furthermore, so that it may accomplish these goals
and continue to serve generation after generation, Article XIV, § 3 requires
the Constitution to undergo periodic review by the people.'" In this con-
nection, we must keep in mind that political power derives from the peo-
ple,119 that government is instituted solely for the good of the whole,12 0 and
that the people may alter or abolish the Constitution and form of govern-
ment whenever they deem it necessary.121 The framers implemented these
fundamental rights-set out in the first two sections of the Declaration of
Rights-in conjunction with Article XIV, § 3 so that the people would "re-
tain a firm hold on the power of constituting government."1 2 2 They be-
lieved that periodic review would strengthen, rather than weaken, the Con-
stitution and the government and would ensure that the Constitution re-
mained relevant as times changed.12 3 But nothing in the Con Con debates
suggests that the framers intended the Constitution to be scrapped or gratui-
114. See e.g. Goldstein v. Commn. on Prac., 995 P.2d 923, 944 (Mont. 2000) (Nelson & Trieweiler,
JJ., dissenting); Associated Press v. Dept. of Revenue, 4 P.3d 5, 22-23 (Mont. 2000) (Nelson &
Leaphart, JJ., specially concurring); Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 144-146 (Nelson & Trieweiler, JJ., specially
concurring); Massee v. Thompson, 90 P.3d 394, 408-409 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., specially concurring
and dissenting); Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 463 (Nelson, J., specially concurring); Prosser, 179 P.3d at
1194 (Nelson, J., dissenting); State v. Clark, 193 P.3d 934, 941 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson & Morris, JJ.,
specially concurring); Baxter, 354 Mont. at 261-263 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
115. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-434.
116. See Liu, supra n. 6, at 1.
117. Mont. Const. preamble (emphasis added).
118. "If the question of holding a convention is not otherwise submitted during any period of 20
years, it shall be submitted as provided by law at the general election in the twentieth year following the
last submission." Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 3.
119. Id. at art. II, § 1.
120. Id.
121. Id. at art. II, § 2.
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tously revised every 20 years if it is already working fine-as it is now. To
the contrary, they viewed the Constitution as a living document, adaptable
to the changing conditions and evolving norms of our society. They in-
cluded a requirement for periodic review as the mechanism to guarantee
that the Constitution would continue to be relevant, should the three
branches of government fail to implement its vision, and also to ensure that
Montanans would know what is in their Constitution.12 4
Lending further support for this view of the Constitution as a living
document is the Bill of Rights Committee's explanation of Article II,
§ 34. 125 The committee stated that this provision "is a crucial part of any
effort to revitalize the state government's approach to civil liberties ques-
tions" and "may be the source of innovative judicial activity in the civil
liberties field." 126 The fact that the delegates contemplated a "revitaliza-
tion" of the government's approach to civil liberties through "innovative"
judicial activity under the Constitution belies any notion that the delegates
intended restrictive interpretations of the document based exclusively on
public understandings of its words in 1972. In point of fact, they wanted
future generations to interpret the Constitution in the light of their whole
experience.
For example, when the right of individual privacy1 2 7 was written and
adopted in 1972, the framers unquestionably were concerned about inva-
sions of privacy through modern technologies.12 8 It is doubtful, however,
that they specifically envisioned the use of thermal imaging by the police to
observe persons and activities within one's home or business. Still, nothing
in the language of the Constitution leads to the conclusion that they ex-
pected the courts to ignore the development of such technology and the
capacity of it to invade individual privacy. In fact, the framers intended the
privacy provision to adapt with time to modem circumstances and thereby
maintain the intended prohibition against warrantless invasions of privacy
by means of surveillance equipment, in whatever form that equipment
might come. 129
Likewise, nothing in the language of Article X suggests that the fram-
ers expected student education to remain static from 1972 to 2010, 2030, or
2100. To the contrary, they expected the State to "develop the full educa-
tional potential of each person," a requirement whose satisfaction necessa-
124. See supra n. 17, and accompanying text.
125. Mont. Const. art. H, § 34 ('The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people.").
126. Constitutional Convention Transcript Vol. II, supra n. 10, at 645.
127. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
128. See generally Mont. Const. Cony. Transcr., vol V, pp. 1681-1682, 1687 (1972) (available at
http://courts.mt.gov/content/library/mt-consconvention/vol5.pdf).
129. See Siegal, 934 P.2d at 192.
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rily depends on, and must be evaluated under, present circumstances. Our
society is continually developing, particularly in the area of science and
technology; and, as a result, the present generation must know more, about
more, than the past generation, even if, necessarily, less than the next gener-
ation. The framers expected the Legislature to step up to the plate and keep
the vision of "full educational potential" alive.130
Other examples abound, but the point is that when it comes to issues of
humanity, government, society, culture, and technology, the framers in-
tended our Constitution to be as relevant in 2010 as it was in 1972. And
they succeeded. The Constitution is relevant precisely because it has
proven adaptable to the changing conditions and the evolving norms of our
society. The Constitution adapted to protect citizens from warrantless sur-
veillance using thermal imaging in 1997131 (at a time when such protection
was not recognized under federal law1 3 2). It adapted to protect adult, con-
senting homosexuals from governmental interference in their intimate rela-
tions in 1997133 (again, when such protection was not recognized under
federal law134 ). It adapted to protect a woman's right to obtain a legal med-
ical procedure by a licensed healthcare provider free from legislative inter-
ference in 1999,135 to protect against the degradation of Montana's waters
in 1999,136 and (in my view, at least) to protect the right to physician aid in
dying in 2009.137 The notion that these and other established constitutional
protections could not have been recognized and enforced without some evi-
dence that they existed in the minds of the Con Con delegates and the pub-
lic in 1972 is not only implausible, but downright absurd and, more impor-
tantly, contrary to the intent and vision of those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution.
The framers did not write, and the people did not adopt, a Constitution
devoid of life-a cookbook of disconnected and discrete rules written with
the vitality of an automobile insurance policy 138-a compendium of unen-
forceable illusory rightsl 39-an expression of mere dreams and aspirations
130. Indeed, in my view, a quality education is a fundamental right. See Kaptein v. Conrad Sch.
Dist., 931 P.2d 1311, 1318 (Mont. 1997) (Nelson & Leaphart, JJ., specially concurring).
131. See Siegal, 934 P.2d at 192.
132. See U.S. v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), reversed, Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
133. See Gryczan, 942 P.2d 112.
134. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
135. See Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364.
136. See MEIC, 988 P.2d 1236.
137. See Baxter, 354 Mont. at 254-269 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
138. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
139. See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, Trieweiler, Leaphart,
& Cotter, JJ., specially concurring).
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to strive for when convenient. 14 0 No. Montana's Constitution is a living
document-a being. And, it is proper-indeed, mandatory-that it be in-
terpreted in the context of that life and vision.
Therefore, while it is appropriate that the Con Con delegates' under-
standings be considered as instructive when interpreting Montana's Consti-
tution, those understandings are by no means dispositive, especially where
the changing conditions and evolving norms of Montana society, or the
plain language of the provision at issue, dictate or allow a different or less-
cabined, less-originalist interpretation. It is axiomatic that:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.
They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is
their care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no
prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under
any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it
would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have
little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formu-
las. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.14 1
These observations are as compelling in 2010 as they were in 1910, if not
more so. I believe the language of Montana's Constitution has the "capac-
ity of adaptation to a changing world[,]"142 and it must be interpreted with
this capacity in mind so that the Constitution retains its vitality and the
rights therein are not "lost in reality."1 4 3
Accordingly, my interpretational approach to questions involving the
Montana Constitution is one of fidelity to the constitutional vision. I be-
lieve this vision is informed by the intent of the framers, by the text of the
Constitution, and, importantly, by the ineffable spirit of the living docu-
ment. Read as an integrated whole, the Constitution-the peoples' organic
law-not only establishes the structure of tripartite governance, but also,
just as importantly, protects the purity, beauty, and diversity of our state's
land, air, and water, provides for a system of education which will develop
the full educational potential of each successive generation, and ensures that
values which matter most to Montanans-fair treatment, independence, ac-
countability and transparency in government, individual privacy, and
140. See id.; Baxter, 354 Mont. at 259 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
141. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
142. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
143. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
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human dignity-are not infringed by the governmentl44 or at least no more
than is necessary to provide for the common good.14 5 While to a large
extent each is legally discrete, I nonetheless attempt to resolve constitu-
tional questions keeping this context and vision in mind. The letter of the
Constitution goes hand in hand with its spirit.
There are cases where the Court must balance constitutional provisions
against each other. 14 6 In fact, the Constitution expressly requires that the
presumptive right to know be balanced against the demands of individual
privacy. 14 7 Moreover, various provisions of the Constitution often must be
read and applied together-keeping in mind the "overlapping and redun-
dant" nature of those provisions. 14 8 For example, in the search-and-seizure
context, the Court reads Article H1, § 10 (right of individual privacy) and
Article II, § 11 (right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures)
together. 149 In the case of a mentally ill inmate who was being abused at
the Montana State Prison, the Court read and applied Article II, § 4 (the
dignity clause) together with Article II, § 22 (the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments) to require that such mistreatment be stopped.15 0
The Court also read Article II, § 3 and Article IX, § 1 together in Mon-
tana's first case involving the right to a clean and healthful environment' 51
and has read Article II, § 9 (right to know) together with Article II, § 8
(right to participate in the operation of governmental agencies). 15 2 I suggest
that other provisions of the Constitution could be read and applied together
as well, in the appropriate case. By way of example: the right to acquire,
possess, and protect property (Article II, § 3) with the right to just compen-
sation for a taking or damaging of private property for public use (Article
II, § 29),15 and the right of access to the courts (Article II, § 16) with the
144. See Baxter, 354 Mont. at 263 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) ("[The right of human dignity]
is the only right in Article I carrying the absolute prohibition of 'inviolability.' No individual may be
stripped of her human dignity under the plain language of the Dignity Clause. No private or govemmen-
tal entity has the right or the power to do so. Human dignity simply cannot be violated-no excep-
tions.").
145. See e.g. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." (empha-
sis added)).
146. See e.g. Great Falls Trib. v. Dist. Ct., 608 P.2d 116, 119 (Mont. 1980) (right to know must be
balanced against defendant's right to an impartial jury).
147. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9; Yellowstone Co. v. Billings Gaz., 143 P.3d 135, 144 (Mont. 2006)
(Nelson, J., concurring); Havre Daily News v. City of Havre, 142 P.3d 864, 822-833 (Mont. 2006)
(Nelson & Cotter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. See Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364, 372; supra nn. 21-31.
149. See Bullock, 901 P.2d at 75; State v. Cotterell, 198 P.3d 254, 259 (Mont. 2008).
150. See Walker, 68 P.3d at 883-885.
151. See MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
152. See Great Falls Trib., 82 P.3d at 886.
153. See Buhmann, 201 P.3d at 101-103 (Nelson & Swandal, JJ., dissenting).
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right to due process of law (Article H, § 17), the abrogation of sovereign
immunity (Article II, § 18), or the right to a jury trial (Article H, § 26).154
Finally, I strongly believe (and have argued' 55) that, consistent with
the interpretational approach I have described above, the Montana Supreme
Court should take up the framers' challenge "to revitalize the state govern-
ment's approach to civil liberties questions" and to utilize Article II, § 34
(unenumerated rights) as "the source of innovative judicial activity in the
civil liberties field."' 5 6 Unfortunately, as professors Elison and Snyder
point out, this part of the constitutional vision-the revitalization of civil
liberties in Montana through innovative judicial activity-has not been real-
ized.157 In my view, it should be.
In conclusion, I believe in Montana's 1972 Constitution. Our courts
(judges and justices, really)-and the Montana Supreme Court in particu-
lar-bear the critical responsibility of construing and interpreting that docu-
ment. The courts say what the law is; what the Constitution means. Indeed,
this power of judicial review is elemental. It is one of the fundamental
checks and balances in our tripartite structure of government. A strong and
independent judiciary stands as the guardian of the peoples' constitutional
rights, liberties, and obligations. And it is the protector of the minority
from the tyranny of the majority.
Judges and justices differ in their individual philosophies and ap-
proaches to discharging their power of judicial review. That is a strength,
not a weakness, in our system of justice. The collaborative agreement or
disagreement of trial and appellate judges in reviewing a constitutional is-
sue stands as the strongest guarantee that the issue will be thoroughly ex-
amined in light of the arguments and the record and that the issue will be
correctly decided.
My individual approach to questions involving Montana's Constitution
is one of fidelity to the constitutional vision-one informed by the intent of
the framers, by the plain language of the Constitution, and, importantly, by
the ineffable spirit of the living document, read as an integrated whole, in
the context of the times.
I firmly believe that Montana's Constitution is the finest, most pro-
gressive state constitution in the country. I want to keep it that way. In my
154. See also the combination of provisions referred to above. See supra nn. 21-31.
155. See e.g. Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 145-148 (Nelson & Trieweiler, JJ., specially concurring); Snet-
singer, 104 P.3d at 463-464 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
156. Constitutional Convention Transcript Vol. II, supra n. 10, at 645; Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 145-146
(Nelson & Trieweiler, JJ., specially concurring).
157. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 18, at 86.
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over three decades as an attorney and 17 years as one of Montana's appel-
late judges, I have been privileged and honored to support, protect, and
defend our Constitution. And I look forward to ending my career doing the
same.
Montana's Constitution is the living embodiment of the human need to
be governed not only efficiently, but also fairly, respectfully, and justly.
Our Constitution fosters the common good of the people but guarantees that
the individual will not be swallowed up by the whole. The 12,000 words of
Montana's Constitution "have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters."15 1
We inherit the past but borrow the future from our children. Our Con-
stitution has served us well, and it will continue to serve future generations
of Montanans in that same fashion. The promise of Montana's Constitution
will endure. We must keep faith with its vision.
158. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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